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This short essay, forthcoming in Competition Policy International, summarizes and 
evaluates Jeffrey Rohlfs’ 1974 Bell Journal paper, “A Theory of Interdependent 
Demand for a Telecommunications Service.”  Rohlfs’ work helped create a large 
literature on markets with network externalities in which demand decisions have 
long-lasting consequences, a literature that has informed competition policy.  But 
Rohlfs assumed that demand-side decisions did not have long-lasting consequences.  
Social networking and Internet-based markets of this sort are increasingly important 
but have not been extensively studied.  While they may pose interesting antitrust 
challenges, they are almost certainly not the challenges to which the post-Rohlfs 
literature pointed. 
 
I. Introduction  
Jeffrey Rohlfs’ pioneering 1974 study of demand in the presence of network externalities,2
  In most of the post-Rohlfs network-effects literature, buyers are modeled as making long-
term product or technology choices because those choices either involve the purchase of significant 
durable goods or create switching costs.  Examples include the choices between VHS and Betamax 
VCRs or between Apple and Wintel computers, or the choice to purchase an early fax machine.   
 which 
make each actor’s demand for some good or service depend in part on whether others purchase it, 
laid the foundation for a huge academic literature that has had a major impact on antitrust policy.  
The government’s case in U.S. v. Microsoft, for instance, relied heavily on network externality 
arguments.  
 In contrast, Rohlfs presents a model that seems better suited to analysis of new Internet-
based businesses that rely on network effects, like Facebook and YouTube.  These businesses 
provide services rather than durable goods, and their customers are not required to make long-term 
commitments.  Switching costs are at most moderate, and customers can often participate in 
multiple competing networks at the same time.  (In the terminology of the recent, related literature 
                                                 
1 Howard W. Johnson Professor of Economics and Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  I am indebted 
to David Evans and Joe Farrell for helpful comments, but errors and opinions are mine alone.  It is a particular pleasure 
to help increase awareness of the Rohlfs paper both because its insights have shaped some of my own recent work (as 
discussed below) and because I remember Jeff fondly from our time together in graduate school at MIT. 
2 Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Telecommunications Service, Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 5, 16-37 (1974), reprinted in this issue of Competition Policy International. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1802053
2 
 
on two-sided markets, they can “multi-home.”3
 Rohlfs’s fundamental assumption was that the amount any individual firm or household 
would be willing to pay for a telecommunications service would depend on the set of other 
individuals with whom they could use that service to communicate.  This effect, what we now call a 
direct network effect or externality, seems to have been recognized from the first days of the 
telephone industry.  (The recent two-sided markets literature, in contrast, focuses mainly on indirect 
network externalities, in which participation by one customer group makes a platform more 
attractive to another customer group.)  Rohlfs’ was not the first formal analysis to incorporate this 
assumption: his paper cites earlier articles by Artle & Averous and by Squire that do so.
)  Thus I think the Rohlfs paper deserves to be read 
carefully on its own, apart from the literature it helped to launch. 
4
 The next section provides a guide to Rohlfs’ analysis.  It is, I hope, a bit easier to digest than 
the paper it attempts to exposit, but it is intended mainly for economists and lawyers who are 
tolerant of formal reasoning.  None of its equations are essential for Section III, which describes the 
impact Rohlfs’ paper has had and considers some of its implications for both economic analysis of 
and competition policy toward Facebook-like businesses. 
  Those 
papers were concerned with optimal telecommunications pricing, however, while Rohlfs’ generally 
took price as given and provided a deeper, more general analysis of the implications of network 
externalities for market demand—without, it should be noted, ever using the term “network 
externalities.” 
II. A New Telecommunications Service 
Writing as a Member of the Technical Staff at Bell Laboratories, Rohlfs was mainly concerned with 
the problem of launching a new telecommunications service (his main example, in 1974, was a 
video communications service) and thus with disequilibrium situations.  His most general model (in 
Section 2) begins with the assumption that, all else equal, if any individual i subscribes to the 
telecommunications service under consideration, her utility will not be decreased and may be 
increased if any other individual j also subscribes.  Since in the 1970s customers of the Bell System 
                                                 
3 See, e.g.,Jean-Charles Roche and Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, Rand Journal of Economics 37, 
645-67 (2006).  
  
4 Roland Artle and Christian Averous, The Telephone System as a Public Good: Static and Dynamic Aspects, Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Science 4, 89-100 (1973) and Lyn Squire, Some Aspects of Optimal Pricing for 
Telecommunications, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 4, 515-525 (1973).  
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could only rent telephones and other terminal equipment, it was natural for Rohlfs to assume that 
subscriptions to a new service would involve only a per-period price, with no fixed cost of 
subscribing or unsubscribing. 
 Under these assumptions, Rohlfs defines an equilibrium user set: taking prices and all other 
individuals’ status as given, each individual in such a set wishes to continue to subscribe to the 
service, and each individual not in the set does not wish to subscribe.  This is a natural Nash 
equilibrium concept, but note that it rules out both explicitly coordinated behavior and non-myopic 
behavior that depends on expectations of others’ future actions.  Since decisions to subscribe or 
unsubscribe could be reversed at little, if any, cost in the regulated telecommunications sector circa 
1974, it is not unreasonable to assume that expectations about the future would not affect an 
individual’s current actions.  As we discuss below, however, coordination devices could nonetheless 
have both private and social value. 
 Rohlfs notes that it is a fundamental feature of this model that equilibrium user sets are not 
generally unique.  Consider, for example, a population of four individuals in which individuals 1 
and 2 are willing to pay a lot to be able to communicate with each other but neither has any interest 
in individual 3 or individual 4.  Suppose the situation is symmetric, so that individuals 3 and 4 are 
eager to communicate with each other but care nothing for 1 or 2.  Then, if the service is of no value 
unless it enables you to communicate with somebody you care about and if its price is low enough, 
there will be four equilibrium user sets: the null set, individuals 1 and 2, individuals 3 and 4, and all 
four individuals.   
 Whenever the service is of no value to any individual unless at least one other individual 
subscribes, the null set, in which no one subscribes, is always an equilibrium user set.  Similarly, in 
more general settings there may also be a dramatic difference between the largest and smallest 
equilibrium user sets, and, as Rohlfs notes, “In a practical situation, this difference may mean the 
difference between marketing success and failure.”5
 Real markets with large numbers of participants rarely leap instantly to equilibrium, 
particularly when they involve novel goods or services.  To reflect this, Rohlfs considers a broad 
class of adjustment processes in which, out of equilibrium, each individual who wishes to subscribe 
or unsubscribe does so with some finite lag.  In general, the equilibrium set to which such processes 
converge depends on the initial set of subscribers and, possibly, on the details of the adjustment 
  
                                                 
5 Rohlfs, supra note 1, at p. 24. 
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process.  In particular, Rohlfs notes, “It may be critical whether or not the disequilibrium non-users 
subscribe before the disequilibrium users drop out.”6
 In order to obtain sharper results, Rohlfs turns in his Section 3 to the special case in which 
the utility of the service to any one individual depends only on the number of other individuals who 
also subscribe, which he refers to as the uniform calling model, and the relationship is linear.  This 
portion of the paper has perhaps been the most influential.  Let f be the fraction of the total relevant 
population that subscribes.  Then for a given positive price, p, a typical individual i will want to 
subscribe to the service if and only if 
   
(1)     fwi – p ≥ 0,  or  wi ≥ p/f. 
where wl is a non-negative constant.  For a large population, one can treat the wi as distributed 
according to a smooth probability density function, h(w).   
 Given all the assumptions in the preceding paragraph, the shape of h(w) and the 
corresponding distribution function, H(w), will determine the characteristics of market demand.  
Taking price as given, if the fraction of the population currently subscribing is f, the fraction of the 
population who will want to subscribe once they know this, f*, is just the fraction of the population 
for which equation (1) is satisfied: 
(2)     f*(f | p) = 1 – H(p/f). 
Because distribution functions are non-decreasing, the function f*(f) is non-increasing in p and non-
decreasing in f.  If f*(f1| p) = f1, then, given p, there is an equilibrium user set consisting of the 
fraction f1 of the population with the largest values of w.  As long as price is positive, the null set (f 
= 0) is always an equilibrium user set, since H(∞) = 1 for any distribution function.  There may be 
no equilibrium user sets with f > 0, or there may be one or more such sets.  If H(p) = 1, so that 
everyone in the population is willing to pay price p, then f*(1 | p) = 1, and the whole population is 
an equilibrium user set. 
 To analyze disequilibrium situations, Rohlfs considers a general class of adjustment 
mechanisms according to which f increases over time if f < f*, and f decreases over time if f > f*.  It 
is then easy to show that if there are equilibria with f > 0, stable and unstable equilibria must 
                                                 
6 Id. 
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alternate.7  That is, if the null set is a stable (unstable) equilibrium, the next smallest, if it exists, 
must be unstable (stable), and so on.  Rohlfs defines the critical mass problem for the new system 
as the problem of somehow reaching a level of f such that f* > f and the business is viable at the 
next highest stable equilibrium, to which the system will then tend over time if price remains fixed.  
He notes, however, that attaining the socially optimal equilibrium user set “may require ruinous 
(albeit temporary) promotional costs.”8   Moreover, he adds that although he naturally assumes in 
his analysis “that the product is viable, it is worth noting that in real life the seller would have no 
such guarantee.”9
 If there are multiple stable equilibria, it may be advantageous for both the seller and its 
customers (for whom participation by others adds value) if the market attains an equilibrium with 
high participation rather than a lower equilibrium or even the null equilibrium in which there is zero 
participation.  For this reason, devices to coordinate behavior may have both private and social 
value.  Thus, for instance, Glen Weyl analyzes “insulating tariffs,” in which prices are carefully set 
as functions of participation levels so that the market is guided to the desired equilibrium.
 
10  In 
practice, of course, particularly with highly innovative new products, the distribution of reservation 
prices is unknown and thus so are the available equilibria.  And, partly as a consequence, investors’ 
enthusiasm for spending on costly coordination attempts is typically muted.  On the other hand, it is 
not unusual for new products with network effects to raise price over time as participation grows 
and the product thus becomes more attractive,11
 Much of the analysis in Rohlfs’ Section 3 is devoted to an example in which w is distributed 
uniformly between zero and one, so that H(w) = w over that interval.  Then (2) becomes simply 
          
 and Rohlfs considers strategies of this sort.  One 
can think of these as developing and announcing pieces of insulating tariffs on the fly.  
(3)   ( ) ( )1 / , 0 1.*
0, .
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7 Suppose some equilibrium point, f0,  is stable.  Then df*/df must be less than one at that point, so that f* > f for f just 
below f0, and f* < f for f just above f0 .  But then in order for f and f* to be equal for some f1 > f0, f* must rise faster than 
f near f1, since f* is approaching f from below.  Thus df*/df must exceed one at f1, from which it follows that that 
equilibrium is unstable.  Repeating the argument starting at an unstable equilibrium establishes the result.  
8 Rohlfs, supra note 1, at p 32. 
9 Id. at p. 33. 
10 E. Glen Weyl, A Price Theory of Two-Sided Platforms, American Economic Review 100, 1642-72 (2010).   
11 A common alternative in the Internet world is to keep price to consumers at zero but to degrade quality by adding 
advertising. 
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Solving equation (3) for f = f*, there are at most three distinct equilibria, which are shown in Figure 
1: 
(4)         0 1 2
1 1 4 1 1 4
0, , .
2 2
p p
f f and f
− − + +
= = =   
Note that if p > 1/4, the only equilibrium involves no subscribers, even though if everybody 
subscribed, 3/4 of them would gladly pay more than 1/4.  The problem is that those willing to pay 
less than 1/4 even with the entire population subscribing would leave the service, reducing its 
attractiveness to those who remained, inducing further defections, and so on until the business 
spiraled down to zero. 
 The arrows in Figure 1 illustrate the dynamics of this example for some p < 1/4.  The 
smallest equilibrium, f0, is stable; the next smallest, f1, is unstable, and the largest, f2, is stable.  At 
the given price, the critical mass problem is to get the fraction of the population subscribing above 
f1.  It that can’t be done, the subscriber base will inevitably shrink to zero, but if it is done, network 
effects will fuel organic growth to the largest equilibrium, f2. 
 In Section 4, Rohlfs generalizes the linear utility model in equation (1) to a situation in 
which the population can be divided into k groups.  Initially he assumes that individuals in group i 
care only about the number of other individuals in group i who subscribe; then he allows for inter-
group externalities.  In the latter case the analysis involves considerations of group-specific critical 
mass levels, and the ultimate equilibrium reached from any specific starting point depends on the 
details of both that point and the adjustment process. 
 Rohlfs’ Section 5 considers two approaches to solving the start-up problem for a new 
service: 1) free service to a carefully selected group of people for a limited period of time, and 2) a 
low introductory price that is raised over time.  If being a subscriber has value only to the extent 
that it enables communication (rather than, say, because it is a status symbol), the hard part is 
getting two or more individuals with high values of w to subscribe at a positive price.  In theory, at 
least, this might be done by offering the service for free for a limited time to a targeted group, then 
raising price just above zero so that at least a few high-w individuals find it optimal to remain 
subscribers.  
 Once this has been done successfully, however, at least in the uniform calling case, price can 
then be increased gradually over time according to some function pg(f).  As long as pg(f) <  f(1-f),  f* 
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will exceed f from (3), and the subscriber base will grow.  (Once again, it doesn’t matter whether 
individuals anticipate later price increases or not, since myopic behavior is individually rational 
here.)  When the optimal level of price is reached, price is constant thereafter, and the system 
adjusts to the higher, stable equilibrium corresponding to that price.  These pricing policies are, as I 
noted above, broadly in the spirit of Weyl’s insulating tariffs, but Rohlfs seems to view them as 
generally being developed as information about demand arrives, rather than as the results of ex ante 
optimization with demand known. 
 Rohlfs establishes a very neat result in this context.  Suppose that at some point, after the 
price has been raised to p0 > 0 and all those who find it optimal to unsubscribe have done so, a 
fraction f0 > 0 of the population finds it optimal to remain on the system. Then as long as pg(f) is 
less than  f(1-f), as above, and the elasticity of pg(f) with respect to its argument does not exceed 
one, the system will grow and no subscriber will ever leave.12
 All this rests on the extremely unrealistic assumption that the distribution of the wi is 
somehow known, of course. And, as Rohlfs shows, if the uniform calling assumption does not hold, 
devising a startup strategy necessarily becomes more complex even if all taste distributions are 
known, and the details of non-uniformity matter. 
   
III. Impact and Implications 
Jeffrey Rohlfs’ 1974 paper has been widely cited – 669 times according to Google Scholar – but its 
importance beyond telecommunications took some time to be recognized.13  The first widely cited 
paper that I can find that cites the Rohlfs paper is a 1980 survey of the economic theory of clubs.14  
The literature on network externalities, and with it citations of the Rohlfs paper, exploded in the 
mid-1980s with the publication of influential papers by Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner and by 
Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro that acknowledged Rohlfs’ contribution.15
                                                 
12 If at some value of f, household i finds it optimal to subscribe, it must be that wi ≥ p*(f)/f.  This household will remain 
a subscriber as f increases if p*(f)/f does not increase, which is equivalent to the requirement that the elasticity of p* 
with respect to f not exceed unity.  Rohlfs requires p*(f) to be concave because he assumes that it passes through the 
origin. 
 
13 All citation counts are as of March 10, 2011. 
14 Todd Sandler and John T. Tschirhart, The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey, Journal of Economic 
Literature 18, 1481-1521 (1980).  This article has 330 Google Scholar citations. 
15 Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, Rand Journal of Economics 16, 70-
83 (1985) and Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 
Journal of Political Economy 94, 822-841.  These papers have 1662 and 1713 Google Scholar citations, respectively.  
Interestingly enough, the most frequently cited of the first-round network externality papers by these authors (Michael 
L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, American Economic Review 73, 424-
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 As noted above, however, the literature that grew out of these papers deals with very 
different market environments than those considered by Rohlfs.  In a widely cited 1994 survey, 
Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro note that in this literature’s analysis of technology adoption and 
product selection decisions, expectations and coordination play important roles.16
 Katz and Shapiro’s initial example of a technology adoption decision is the decision to buy a 
fax machine.
  As we noted 
above, expectations and coordination do not appear at all in the Rohlfs analysis, with the exception 
that he considers increasing price paths as a device to attain a desirable equilibrium.   
17  In that decision expectations about the behavior of other potential fax machine 
owners are clearly important.  Had fax machines existed in the early 1970s when Rohlfs was 
writing, however, they would have been available only for rent from the local telephone company, 
and expectations and coordination would have been of much less importance in decision-making 
about subscribing to fax services.  Similarly, expectations and coordination were clearly important 
in making many of the product selection decisions between incompatible rival “hardware/software” 
systems that they describe as being “in the newspaper almost every day.”18
 The focus of this post-Rohlfs network-effects literature on technology and product selection 
decisions with long-lasting consequences sent two important messages to competition policy-
makers.  The first was implicit: technology adoption and product selection were generally modeled 
as discrete, once-and-for-all decisions that typically produced winner-take-all results.  Not only is 
that how the choice between Beta and VHS seemed to most observers at the time, but to model 
multi-stage processes, in which expectations of future technologies and products (like DVDs and 
Blu-Ray and…) could influence today’s choices, would have involved considerable incremental 
complexity.  The second was explicit: most theoretical analysis showed that market outcomes in 
markets with once-and-for-all competition and network effects could be seriously socially 
  These include the 
choice between Beta and VHS video recording systems and among rival home video game systems.  
Again, if short-term rental of the “hardware” parts of these systems were available, expectations and 
coordination would be much less important. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
440 (1985)), which has 4113 Google Scholar citations, does not cite the Rohlfs paper.  It cites instead a later paper that 
in turn cites Rohlfs’ paper, along with the related earlier papers by Artle and Averous and by Squire, cited here in note 
3, supra. 
16 Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, 
93-115 (1994).  This article has 1621 Google Scholar citations.  Katz and Shapiro also note that the literature they 
survey considers compatibility decisions, but these are beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
17 Id. at p. 93. 
18 Id. at p. 105. 
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inefficient: buyers could find themselves selecting the wrong product or technology, and society 
could be locked-in to those bad choices for the foreseeable future. 
 Katz and Shapiro do counsel caution in their 1994 survey and note that, “In short, we are far 
from having a general theory of when government intervention is preferable to an unregulated 
market outcome.”19  The literature they surveyed nonetheless suggested that, at the very least, 
competition authorities should pay particular attention to competition in industries with network 
effects to ensure that firms with short-run market power don’t use anticompetitive behavior and 
network effects to build and lock in dominant positions for the long haul.  As Carl Shapiro, then 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department 
of Justice, put it in a January, 1996 speech:20
Even more so than in other areas, antitrust policy in network industries must pay 
careful attention to firms’ business strategies, the motives behind these strategies, 
and their likely effects…  Furthermore, antitrust enforcers must be alert in these 
industries because the very nature of the “positive feedback” cycle means that 
monopolization may be accomplished swiftly.  And, once achieved, the network 
effects that helped create dominance may make it more difficult for new entrants to 
dislodge the market leader than in other industries lacking network characteristics. 
 
The Justice Department’s Sherman Act case against Microsoft, which rested heavily on arguments 
involving network effects, was filed in May, 1998. 
 All this suggests that the Rohlfs paper reprinted here may have become one of those classics 
that is often cited but rarely read.  I think that is unfortunate, but not because the network-effects 
literature than began in the mid-1980s is wrong in any technical sense or inapplicable to some 
markets.  Nor do I think the policy concerns it raised are not relevant in those markets or that the 
enforcement stance expressed by Professor Shapiro in the thoughtful speech just cited is 
inappropriate in those markets.21
                                                 
19 Id. at p. 113. 
   
20 Speech delivered by Carl Shapiro before the American Law Institute and American Bar Association, January 25, 
1996, p. 6; available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/0593.pdf. 
21 But see Richard Schmalensee, Antitrust Issues in Schumpeterian Industries, American Economic Review Papers and 
Proceedings 90, 471-5 (2000) and David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust 
Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries, in A. Jaffe, J. Lerner, and S. Stern, eds., Innovation Policy and the 
Economy 2, 1-49 (2002). 
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 The point is that the network-effects literature that began in the mid-1980s does not seem to 
have much to say about markets in which product or technology choices do not have long-lasting 
consequences – markets like those analyzed by Rohlfs.  Without durability, expectations are not 
critical to decision-making, and lock-in is much less likely, particularly if multi-homing is possible. 
 And, as David Evans and I have argued,22
 It is particularly interesting to note that video communications services, of the sort that 
Rohlfs could only hypothesize in the early 1970s, are now generally available on the Internet.  And, 
as Rohlfs assumed, network effects plainly matter in choosing which service to use.  But deciding to 
use one or another at any point in time has essentially no long-term implications.  I currently 
software for two such services on my computer and could no doubt access others if I saw benefits 
from doing so.  I have no reason to care which service will prove more popular in the future, as I 
can use any one when it is worth using and ignore it otherwise.   
 “almost every day” one now reads about markets 
of the sort analyzed by Rohlfs.  Consider social networks, for instance.  There are clearly direct 
network effects in these businesses: the value of being a participant in any particular social network 
depends on who else is participating.  (There are also indirect network effects in these businesses, 
since participants attract advertisers.)  But it is easy to switch between networks or to participate in 
multiple networks at the same time.  Thus despite its early network-effect-enhanced advantages, 
MySpace has been almost totally eclipsed by Facebook, which used a university-based launch 
strategy that could have been cribbed from Rohlfs’ discussion of launching a new service in a 
population consisting of multiple groups with strong intra-group affinities.  Network effects, while 
present, were clearly not the only important factors in competition between MySpace and Facebook. 
 As a final example, consider smart phone operating systems.  As I write this, there is a 
vigorous struggle going on between Apple and Google, with Microsoft and RIM also engaged.  But 
this is not the PC market in the 1990s: consumers buy new smart phones fairly often, and the costs 
of switching between phones based on different operating systems do not seem to be significant.  
Thus, even though consumers don’t generally multi-home in this market, as they easily can for 
social networks and video calling services, product selection does not involve a very durable 
commitment, and competition does not look like a one-shot, winner-take-all affair. 
                                                 
22 David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Failure to Launch: Critical Mass in Platform Businesses, Review of 
Network Economics 9, Article 1 (2010).  That paper provides several brief case studies and generalizes the Rohlfs 
uniform calling analysis to platform businesses serving two customer groups, between which there are indirect network 
externalities.  The nature of the critical mass constraint – “chicken and egg” or “chicken or egg” – is shown to depend 
on details of the adjustment process, and if there are multiple equilibria, stable equilibria and saddle-points alternate. 
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 Thus, while Jeffrey Rohlfs’ paper has been influential in calling the attention of the 
economics profession to markets with network externalities, both economists and policy-makers 
have tended until recently to focus on a particular subset of those market—those in which it is at 
least arguably the case that anticompetitive behavior during critical periods of winner-take-all 
competition may lead to undesirable and long-lasting outcomes.  In such markets, especially close 
attention by antitrust authorities during those critical periods is appropriate.  Rohlfs, however, 
considered a different subset of markets with network effects, one that I believe is becoming more 
important in part because of the internet.  In these markets switching costs are not important, and 
the key decisions do not involve purchases of big-ticket, long-lived durables.  Accordingly, 
participation decisions can easily be reversed.  Moreover, multi-homing is often possible in these 
markets, so even at the individual level competition is not a winner-take-all matter even for short 
periods of time. 
  This is not to say that the markets considered by Rohlfs may not raise novel and interesting 
competition policy issues, since the presence of externalities and the potential for multiple equilibria 
imply the possibility of departures from the textbook norm.  But it is far from clear that such 
markets deserve especially close antitrust scrutiny.23
  
  In any case, I believe Rohlfs’ analysis 
deserves to be read carefully and to be both extended and applied by economists and, further, that 
its implications should be carefully considered by antitrust enforcement agencies as they 
increasingly deal with markets for which that analysis is relevant.  
                                                 
23 If network effects do lead to dominance, for instance, but that dominance can be quickly eroded by a better product 
either because participation decisions can be costlessly reversed or through multi-homing, the general presumption that 
network effects create troublesome entry barriers would not hold.  Joe Farrell has pointed out (personal communication) 
that in some respects this sort of dominance resembles market-wide exclusive dealing contracts of very short duration. 
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Figure 1.  The Example from Rohlfs’ Section 3 
